

THE START TREATY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 23, 25, 26 AND 30, 1992

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**START TREATY: INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
TREATY BETWEEN THE U.S AND THE
U.S.S.R. ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITA-
TION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
SIGNED IN MOSCOW ON JULY 31, 1991
(TREATY DOC. 102-20) AND PROTOCOL
THERE TO DATED MAY 23, 1992 (TREATY
DOC. 102-32)**

TUESDAY, JUNE 30, 1992

**U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.**

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Lugar, and Murkowski.

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order. I am very pleased today to welcome the Director of Central Intelligence; the Hon. Robert Gates; and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. James Clapper, before the committee this morning.

We are joined, I believe, by Mr. Douglas MacEachin, Chief of the Arms Control Intelligence Staff, and Dr. Lawrence Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs.

Our committee will take statements now and will have some questions before moving upstairs to a closed session where we will explore intelligence issues with these and other witnesses.

This is the 14th hearing the committee has held on START this year, following transmittal of the START Treaty. We will hear this afternoon from Gen. Robert Parker, Director of the On-Site Inspection Agency at 2:30 p.m., today in this room.

The START Treaty is truly a major accomplishment of unprecedented scope and detail. It is essential that the Senate ascertain that the intelligence community is convinced that there will be compliance with this treaty which deals directly with our vital national security.

I would ask the Director if he could proceed. When the ranking minority member arrives, we will ask you to desist so he can make his welcoming statement and then we will carry on. Director Gates.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE; ACCOMPANIED BY DOUGLAS MacEACHIN, CHIEF ARMS CONTROL INTELLIGENCE STAFF FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE; LAWRENCE GERSHWIN, Ph.D., NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR STRATEGIC PROGRAMS FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Mr. GATES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I and my colleagues welcome this opportunity to present to you the intelligence community's judgments regarding our ability to monitor the strategic forces of the CIS under the START Treaty.

As is usual in such testimony, I will present judgments about monitoring, which is an intelligence function, not about verification, which is a broader policy function that the intelligence community supports through its monitoring activities. A full discussion of our monitoring judgments can be found in our National Intelligence Estimate published last year, and, of course, I will be able to be more detailed and specific in the closed session.

As you have indicated, Mr. Chairman, with me is General Clapper, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, whose agency is one of the key players in the intelligence community's efforts to support negotiations and monitor arms control treaties.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to begin my remarks by summarizing the intelligence community's ability to monitor the START Treaty. We are confident that we can monitor most aspects of this treaty well, although there are some areas that will be problematic. This upbeat assessment is a dramatic change from what the intelligence community 4 years ago estimated would be the case under START and from what I reported to the Senate in early 1988 during the INF ratification proceedings.

At that time I said the monitoring tasks required by INF would put the intelligence community at the edge of our existing capabilities, and those tasks envisioned at that time for START would put us over the edge. Fortunately, much has changed since then; both the character of our treaty partners and the additional experience we have gained in monitoring the Soviet mobile ICBM force.

The CHAIRMAN. I would ask if you would desist for a moment while I welcome our acting ranking minority member and also the for photographers who want to take a couple of pictures. I recognize Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for interrupting your testimony, Mr. Gates, and for my tardiness. I just want to join with the chairman in welcoming the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Robert Gates, to the committee this morning, to receive his testimony on the START Treaty now pending before the Senate.

Shortly we will move into closed session for a more detailed exchange with Director Gates and other representatives of the intelligence community, but I think it is important we be as forthcoming as possible in open session in order to give the American public a fair picture of the intelligence community's views on the START Treaty and the role it will play in the implementation of the agreement.

Changing political circumstances aside, we all know that this treaty could have been signed several years earlier were it not for the need to negotiate stringent verification provisions. The verification regime in this treaty is one of the most detailed, complex, and intrusive regimes ever negotiated.

In short, the verifiability of this treaty has always been seen, by supporters and opponents alike, as the key to the Senate consent process. For that reason the position of the intelligence community on the treaty generally, and its verification provisions in particular, are viewed as critical to ratification.

I particularly want to acknowledge the role of Doug MacEachin of the agency, not only in the negotiations on verification provisions of the treaty, but in keeping committee members and staff fully informed of the state of play as the negotiation unfolded.

Both the committee and the Intelligence community learned some valuable lessons from our experience with the CFE Treaty, particularly with regard to data discrepancies and nondeployed weapon systems. But when problem areas were identified by the intelligence community, this committee did not have to drag this information out of the intelligence specialists. The community stepped forward, outlined the areas of concern, and addressed them in a forthright manner in terms of their impact on the treaty and American national interests.

I look forward this morning to the same degree of objectivity and forthrightness from the intelligence community in its assessment of the START Treaty. It is a pleasure, again, to have you with us, Mr. Gates. You are an old friend of the committee and I look forward to your testimony, along with the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. Director Gates, would you carry on.

Mr. GATES. Thank you. Finally, and equally important, are the treaty provisions designed to enhance verification that I will discuss further and which, as Senator Lugar, we helped to formulate.

The intelligence community was deeply engaged in all stages of the interagency process that led to the development of U.S. positions during the START negotiations. We provided extensive assessments of our ability to monitor compliance with treaty provisions being considered for negotiation. In addition, we helped design various verification measures that were included in the treaty to complement our monitoring capabilities and to interact synergistically with our national intelligence means to enhance these monitoring capabilities.

Specifically, the intelligence community helped develop the treaty provisions that ensure our access to telemetric data broadcast during ballistic missile test flights. We also supported the formulation of policy in Washington and the negotiating process itself. All of these support activities were carried out by officers from the various agencies of the intelligence community.

Under START the intelligence community will be expected to monitor the activities associated with the reduction of CIS strategic offensive nuclear forces over a 7-year period, and the subsequent adherence of CIS parties to the numerical limits specified in the treaty. We must also monitor qualitative restrictions on the technical characteristics and capabilities of the weapon systems in-

volved, and locational restrictions contained in the treaty. Finally, we are charged to detect and correctly interpret any activities that are prohibited.

Our monitoring judgments are based on three things: Analyses of testing, production, deployment, and operational practices, as well as engineering assessments of strategic weapon systems characteristics; the strengths and weaknesses of current and programmed collection systems; and the potential contribution of verification measures contained in the treaty.

Most importantly, these judgments are based on three decades of experience in collecting against and analyzing Soviet strategic forces, as well as in monitoring other arms control agreements.

Currently, the United States has a wide array of intelligence sensors to use in monitoring foreign strategic forces. These airborne, land-, sea-, and space-based collectors are commonly referred to our national technical means of verification. Nearly all of our monitoring judgments depend on the availability of these sensors and on the assumption that we will be able to task them as required.

Mr. Chairman, you have specifically asked that I address the impact of current and anticipated budget situations on our monitoring capabilities. The availability of our technical sensors, as well as our ability to monitor this and other agreements now and in the future, is obviously intimately tied to intelligence funding levels.

With the end of the Soviet Union and the cold war, there are those who believe we should now reduce our resources for monitoring CIS military developments, and we are doing so. But in reality there are now no fewer questions being put to us by both the executive branch and the Congress on military-related issues: from the location and status of 30,000 nuclear warheads to the production of all kinds of weapons and missiles, to command and control of the strategic forces, to monitoring arms control agreements like START.

Significant decreases beyond those already planned in the quality or quantity of technical collection against the strategic forces of the CIS in the future will inevitably degrade our ability to monitor the complex provisions of the treaty. Thus we will need to study carefully the potential extent and impact of such reductions, preferably in advance, on a case-by-case basis. In other words, it would not be prudent to diminish our capabilities until we are certain that our remaining capabilities are adequate to do the monitoring task.

Up to now, our collection and assessments of the strategic forces of the former Soviet Union have relied almost exclusively on our own independent technical resources. Despite our impressive array of collection systems, we discerned early on that we would encounter significant uncertainties in monitoring some provisions of the START Treaty. Examples include the difficulty in assessing through NTM alone the number of missiles of a given type that have been produced, or the number of reentry vehicles with which individual missiles are actually loaded.

In this connection, it is useful to remember that our ability to monitor START will not rely entirely on our technical collection systems. Human-source information and open-source information, for example, are more abundant and relevant than in the past.

In addition, the treaty itself contains provisions specifically designed to enhance verification. These include: onsite inspections; continuous monitoring of final assembly facilities for mobile ICBM's; data exchanges; notifications of various activities related to weapons systems and facilities; cooperative measures to enhance our use of NTM; obligations to broadcast unencrypted telemetry during ICBM and SLBM flight tests; and the exchange of tapes containing the telemetric information and interpretive data from these flights.

With the implementation of the verification provisions contained in the treaty, many of our uncertainties will be reduced over time. The value of these provisions for monitoring varies greatly, however, depending on the task. In some cases we can obtain the same information using our technical and human-source collection assets. In other cases, the information gained will be unique.

For example, we believe that the onsite inspection regime to monitor the number of reentry vehicles on ballistic missiles will assist us in determining whether the number of reentry vehicles on any of these missiles exceeds what the treaty allows. This will be especially true with respect to the silo-based ICBM's.

Similarly, those provisions designed to ensure access to data from ballistic missile flight tests will significantly enhance our ability to monitor limitations on the development of new ballistic missiles. Moreover, the inspection regime and regular data exchanges will facilitate our ability to optimize the employment of our intelligence collection systems. And the establishment of permanent monitoring at the declared SS-24 and SS-25 mobile missile final assembly facilities will permit us to count the precise number of mobile missiles exiting those facilities in the future.

For many monitoring tasks, however, treaty provisions will make less of a contribution and we will still rely most heavily on information acquired from our technical sensors. For example, treaty provisions do not prohibit the continued encryption of flight test data from bombers and cruise missiles. Moreover, START's provisions will provide little assistance in detecting prohibited activity at locations the Soviets did not declare.

Because of the limited value of some treaty provisions and the possibility, however remote it may seem today, that steps could be taken in the future by one or more parties to the treaty to obstruct the implementation of these verification provisions, we judge that it will be important to maintain our national technical means to ensure an independent capability to monitor the terms of the treaty.

With regard to monitoring specific limitations in the treaty, our confidence is highest when monitoring activities related to deployed silo-based ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers, as well as the required reductions of these systems. After more than a decade of experience in analyzing Soviet strategic mobile missile operations, we are nearly as certain of our ability to monitor the size of the deployed mobile ICBM force.

But we are less certain about our ability, at any given time, to determine the number of nondeployed missile systems, especially mobile ICBM's and their launchers. Because nondeployed mobile missile systems are inherently more easily hidden and useful for

refire operations and silo-based systems, the treaty limits the number of nondeployed mobile ICBM's and launchers.

Unfortunately, these systems are difficult to monitor with national technical means alone. As a consequence, there are differences within the intelligence community regarding the total number of missiles, and we can neither confirm nor refute the Soviet-supplied data on total nondeployed missile inventories. During the negotiations we were successful in promoting the inclusion of verification measures in the treaty to reduce such uncertainties in the future.

One of the keys to accounting for the number of nondeployed mobile ICBM's is to monitor mobile missile production. Because our national technical means have limited capabilities to do this, the treaty includes provisions for the permanent monitoring of two mobile missile final assembly facilities and mandatory short notice inspections of three other mobile missile production facilities. Over time, as was the case with INF, this arrangement should help to reduce our uncertainty regarding the number of mobile missiles.

Although this arrangement is not foolproof, we believe that these provisions should complicate any effort to covertly produce and deploy an illegal number of nondeployed mobile ICBM's. Assessing the effectiveness of these treaty provisions is the second area where there are significant differences among intelligence community agencies, and I will provide more detail on this during the closed session.

I want to conclude on this point by saying that despite our uncertainties with respect to nondeployed mobile missiles, we believe that we have enough information to judge that the Soviets did not maintain a large-scale program to store several hundred or more undeclared, nondeployed strategic ballistic missiles. We acknowledge, however, that it is possible that some undeclared missiles have been stored at unidentified facilities.

Most of the data supplied thus far by the Soviets and the CIS in the memorandum of understanding have been close to our estimates. However, we were surprised by their declaration in September 1990 that SS-N-18 SLBM's were deployed with only three re-entry vehicles. In late 1987, they had declared that these missiles were to be counted as deployed with seven RV's, which confirmed the intelligence community's estimates. Although we believe that they had some seven-RV missiles deployed in 1990, we cannot rule out that their declaration was correct. In any case, we judge that by now the Russians have had sufficient time to convert the entire SS-N-18 force to the three-RV version.

We also found differences between our estimates and the Soviet-declared throw-weights and launch weights for the SS-19 ICBM and the SS-N-20 SLBM. Upon being queried in Geneva, the Russians provided some clarifying information. With the help of that information and the measurements obtained during the missile technical exhibitions, we have reanalyzed all the data that we used to make our estimates and I will provide the results of that reanalysis in the closed session.

With regard to detecting and correctly interpreting prohibited activity, we examined nearly 40 cheating scenarios. We consulted with the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other experts to en-

sure that we had included those scenarios that would have the most military significance to our strategic military planners.

Not surprisingly, the same areas where we have the most concern with regard to monitoring the treaty provisions are the areas where we would be most concerned about cheating. Because of the inherently covert nature of mobile missiles, the cheating scenarios that could be particularly troublesome are those that would involve the covert production and deployment of such missiles and their launchers. I plan to expand upon this and other areas of potential cheating in the closed session.

Let me add that we doubt that the CIS states will be able in the near term, and perhaps during the life of the treaty, to initiate and successfully execute sophisticated cheating programs, given the current state of social, political, and economic disruption, the reduced influence of military and defense-industrial leaders, and the advent of more aggressive press and legislative oversight activities. Although we cannot exclude the possibility, we judge it unlikely that one or more of the newly independent state, local, or military authorities will attempt to circumvent the treaty in order to preserve some strategic military capability.

We suspect that most compliance questions that arise will be more the result of implementation difficulties than outright cheating. We made the judgments contained in our monitoring estimate in full recognition that the Soviet Union was unraveling as a political entity. Nevertheless, we assumed a continued commitment to the treaty and the capability to implement it.

The signing in May of the protocol in Lisbon suggests that this premise will hold, and that the CIS, at least for the moment, retains firm operational control of all strategic nuclear offensive forces. We must caution, however, that the issues that divide some of these new states, especially Russia and Ukraine, are deep and not likely to be resolved in the near future.

For Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, our fundamental task will be to monitor the total elimination of ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers. In Russia the existence of residual forces after the reduction period will require additional monitoring tasks. For all of these states, the treaty will require intense monitoring and intrusive verification measures, at least during the reduction period. Some level of cooperation among the states will likely be necessary for implementation to go smoothly. Although there have been minor glitches, such cooperation has been realized, thus far, in INF- and START-related inspection activities.

Despite the commitment of the four CIS parties in Lisbon to work together to implement the START Treaty, we anticipate that over the next several years there will be delays in meeting treaty deadlines and confusion over restrictions, notifications, and procedures. If, for whatever reason, CIS arrangements for the control of strategic forces and cooperation among the states relative to START dissolved, the prospects for implementation, as well as our ability to monitor detailed treaty provisions, would probably decline.

The acute desire for Western aid in all four states in which strategic forces are located is a powerful incentive for their cooperation in implementation. However, some of these states may come to

view some of the complex treaty provisions as unnecessarily burdensome, especially those related to verification. Russia has already indicated that it might forego the establishment of a permanent monitoring capability at the U.S. missile production facility near Promontory, UT.

We believe that the recent agreement by Russia to reduce strategic offensive forces to levels deeper than called for in the START Treaty reflects pressures to reduce its defense burden, recognition that all nuclear weapons of the former U.S.S.R. will be located only in Russia, the perception of a decreasing threat, and a commitment to improving relations with the United States.

Indeed, the dramatic geopolitical and military changes of the past few years undercut the fundamental rationale for the Soviet warfighting strategy that was based largely on a large force of MIRV'd ICBM's and a comprehensive warning system. If such unprecedented reductions come about, Russian strategic forces will undergo a significant transformation—from dependence on MIRV'd heavy ICBM's as the backbone of their force to a heavier reliance on SLBM's and bombers. The START Treaty verification and elimination procedures would enhance our ability to monitor such deep reductions.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes the unclassified portion of my remarks. My colleagues and I have a few additional comments to make once we are in closed session.

Before turning to General Clapper and then your questions, however, let me add that we find ourselves at one of those rare watershed periods and points in history where there are new opportunities as well as dangers. Notwithstanding the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, we still have to worry about what happens to the 30,000 nuclear warheads of the former Soviet Union.

The highly refined and focused capabilities of the intelligence community will continue, at least for some years, to be needed to provide unique information and warning to policymakers regarding the evolving status and capabilities of nuclear forces and warheads. Meeting our monitoring tasks under the START Treaty, if it is ratified, will contribute to that mission.

My colleagues and I are now ready to respond to your questions unless General Clapper has something that he would like to add.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Gates. General Clapper.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

General CLAPPER. Mr. Chairman, I will speak very briefly here. I have submitted a statement for the record, and there are just a couple of points on which I might extemporize from that. First, I would endorse what the DCI, Mr. Gates, has just said, and to add publicly that we are confident of our ability to monitor the treaty. This confidence is based largely on evaluation of the monitoring tools that are currently available. Principal among these will be, of course, our national technical means and the extensive experience gained by using these means and observing strategic forces in the former Soviet Union. The treaty provisions that the DCI outlined

calling for data exchanges, onsite inspections, telemetry tape exchanges, various notification, notational restrictions, and cooperative measures will also clearly contribute to our ability to monitor as well as afford a more efficient use of our national technical means.

We doubt that the newly independent states would be able in the near term to initiate and execute sophisticated large-scale cheating programs, nor, frankly, can I see the intent to do so. I would feel compelled to emphasize, though, that our conclusions regarding the monitorability of the START Treaty are based on the premise that both intelligence collection and analytic resources would remain reasonably constant.

Any significant reduction in NTM or manpower resources used to analyze strategic targets in the former Soviet Union, whether by fiscal cutbacks or competing intelligence requirements, would, of course, degrade our ability to monitor START, but given adequate resources I am nonetheless convinced that we can, in fact, adequately monitor adherence to START Treaty provisions.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I am ready for your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Clapper follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLAPPER

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, I will concentrate on the Defense Intelligence Agency's two primary responsibilities with respect to the START Treaty: the tasks of monitoring the Treaty itself and assessing the future strategic capabilities of the Commonwealth of Independent States. We approach these responsibilities knowing that further changes are coming, based on agreements made during the recent U.S.-Russia Summit.

INTRODUCTION

The formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 has major implications for evaluating the START Treaty and future strategic trends. The apparent intention of Russia and the other independent states to adhere to the existing arms control obligations and to pursue even further cuts in their nuclear arsenals are explicit examples of the positive changes in the former Soviet Union. These dramatic political events may also serve to complicate monitoring the former Soviet states' adherence to the terms of the Treaty and to determine their future strategic intentions. The social, economic, military, and political obstacles confronting the newly-independent states are daunting and will not be solved quickly. Nevertheless, we believe START will govern the orderly reduction of the strategic inventories of the former Soviet Union and will provide a stable foundation for future nuclear reductions.

IMPACT OF THE START TREATY AND BEYOND

No matter what the ultimate political outcome of the former Soviet Union's transformation, a large number of modern strategic weapons will continue to exist on its territory. Russia will retain powerful and survivable strategic forces throughout the next decade. We now see the level of the Russian strategic effort as much lower than we had projected in the U.S.S.R. prior to the aborted coup last August. DIA now judges that Russia will curtail or terminate a number of strategic nuclear weapons deployment programs and will, in the future, support far fewer developments. For now, new deployments of strategic offensive systems and work on many development programs continue, but these activities are the result of earlier decisions to modernize forces, rather than a reflection of intent to expand such weapons programs.

Two ICBM systems—the road-mobile SS-25 and the silo-based SS-18—continue to be deployed. In addition, two new ballistic missiles are likely to become operational during this decade: a follow-on to the SS-25 mobile missile and a follow-on to the SS-N-20 deployed on the TYPHOON SSBN. The future of other ballistic missile development programs is uncertain.

Strategic offensive forces deployed in the four nuclear states of the former Soviet Union currently consist of approximately 2,400 deployed launchers and 10,500 deployed warheads. Under START limits, these forces would decline to 1,400 launchers and 6,700 warheads. We believe Soviet military planners have been anticipating START limits for years and have been tailoring their strategic force posture accordingly.

Strategic weapon deactivations, eliminations, and changes in operations have already taken place in anticipation of START and as a result of presidential arms control initiatives. In the near term, we expect an accelerated stand down of nuclear forces. The deterioration of the economy might result in a further decay of strategic forces. Such changes, for the most part, will be detectable by National Technical Means (NTM). Others, however, such as President Yeltsin's statement about changes in nuclear targeting and the removal from alert status of some strategic weapons, will be more difficult for the Intelligence Community to confirm independently.

THE MONITORING PROCESS

Throughout the START negotiations, DIA and the Intelligence Community have carefully examined the prospects for monitoring the START Treaty. The Community has also worked with other U.S. arms control participants to craft provisions that would assist us in monitoring the Treaty. Assessing our ability to monitor the START agreement has been complicated by the complexities of the Treaty itself and the many uncertainties attendant to the transformation of the former U.S.S.R. We will face a more difficult monitoring task than that posed by any other arms control agreement. Unlike INF, where *all* weapons of certain classes were eliminated and subsequently banned, START will require monitoring limits set on large residual forces, as well as a range of technical characteristics of strategic weapon systems.

Nonetheless, we are confident of our ability to monitor this Treaty and this confidence is based largely on an evaluation of the monitoring tools *currently* available. Principal among these will be, of course, our National Technical Means and the extensive experience gained by using these means in observing strategic forces in the former Soviet Union. Treaty provisions calling for data exchanges, on-site inspections, telemetry tape exchanges, various notifications, locational restrictions, and cooperative measures will also clearly contribute to our ability to monitor, as well as affording more efficient use of our NTM.

MONITORING CONFIDENCE

We doubt that the newly independent states would be able in the near term to initiate and execute sophisticated, large-scale cheating programs. Nor can I see the intent to do so.

However, the Intelligence Community does face challenges in monitoring some technical capabilities of ballistic missiles covered by the Treaty. Because of the Treaty provision allowing downloading, or attributing fewer RVs to a missile than it was tested with, uncertainty will remain in determining how many RVs are actually deployed on ballistic missiles during, for example, potential crises. The proposed elimination of land-based MIRVed systems will help to alleviate this concern. The Treaty's provisions prohibiting the denial of flight test data will enhance our ability to monitor the technical characteristics and capabilities of former Soviet ballistic missiles such as throw-weight and RV releases during tests.

CONCLUSION

Finally, I feel compelled to emphasize that our conclusions regarding the monitorability of the START Treaty are based on the premise that both intelligence collection and analytic resources would remain reasonably constant. Any significant reduction in NTM or manpower resources used to analyze strategic targets in the former Soviet Union, whether by fiscal cutbacks or competing intelligence requirements, will degrade our ability to monitor START. Given adequate resources, I am nonetheless convinced that we can, in fact, adequately monitor adherence with START Treaty provisions. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We have a few questions here, and then we will move up to room S-407 as quickly as possible.

I am curious, Director Gates, can you assure the committee that the intelligence community can effectively monitor the compliance of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to the START Treaty

and its protocols? In other words, are you completely confident? You have no reservations with regard to our ability to monitor the treaty?

Mr. GATES. We have no reservations about our ability to monitor the provisions with the exception of the two or three problem areas that I identified. That is, being able to accurately count the number of nondeployed mobile missiles that have been produced already and counting the number of reentry vehicles on the missiles themselves. Those are the primary areas. Nevertheless, I think that it is the judgment of the community that, while the question of what constitutes significant cheating from a military standpoint is a judgment to be made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we believe that large-scale cheating we would be able to detect and report it in a timely way.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give me sort of a best case and worst case estimate on the mobile missiles and the reentry vehicles on those missiles?

Mr. GATES. In terms of the numbers, as I briefly mentioned in the prepared statement, CIA and DIA have divergent numbers on the number of nondeployed missiles that we think that the CIS may already have. There is scant information on this subject, but what drives the difference in our views is different assumptions about the size of the reserve of these missiles that have been maintained by the Soviets and now the CIS.

In terms of the specific numbers of missiles and what that range is between agencies, let me turn to Larry Gershwin, the National Intelligence Officer.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, a best case and a worst case.

Mr. GATES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GERSHWIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, the Russians are allowed by the treaty to maintain a certain number of nondeployed missiles in any case; up to, I believe it is, 250 nondeployed missiles with warheads on them, and those are conceivably capable of being mobilized in a crisis or wartime into national forces.

Beyond that, we would not expect there to be, at an absolutely worst case, more than a few hundred nondeployed missiles that are illegal, so in an absolute worst case we are talking about several hundred nuclear missiles, most of which would not have multiple warheads in any case.

The CHAIRMAN. So the worst case would be several hundred.

Mr. GERSHWIN. At worst case it would be several hundred additional missiles.

The CHAIRMAN. Worst case being three-hundred or so?

Mr. GERSHWIN. We cannot really be precise about this, because the information on this is very scant.

The CHAIRMAN. And the best case?

Mr. GERSHWIN. The best case is that the Soviets are fully compliant, and that the number of missiles they declare is exactly what they have.

The CHAIRMAN. With regard to reentry vehicles, would that be the same?

Mr. GERSHWIN. Yes. We would be talking about numbers of illegal missiles with warheads in the several hundred extra warheads range.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I will reserve my further questions for upstairs. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

In the committee, Mr. Gates, we are having an intramural debate, in a sense, regarding the timing of Senate action on the START Treaty, and whether to deal with START I immediately or to wait for the deMIRVing follow-on treaty and deal with both in tandem.

From the standpoint of the Intelligence Committee and its role in monitoring compliance of the treaty's provisions, are there any advantages or disadvantages to the Senate dealing with START I now and facilitating the exchange of the instruments of ratification at the earliest possible moment, as opposed to awaiting the outcome of the drafting process on the follow-on agreement?

Mr. GATES. That is a difficult question for an intelligence officer, Senator Lugar. Let me try to answer and then invite any of my colleagues to either differ or offer a different perspective.

My view would be that there would be some advantage in moving ahead because of the desirability in a very turbulent and uncertain political environment in the CIS to locking in the successor states and their obligations to begin reducing these systems. I think it is fair to say that the situation inside Russia and inside the republics is one in which the potential for real change and perhaps unelcome change exists.

Clearly, I think the role of President Yeltsin is critical, and if something should happen to President Yeltsin I think you could find some different political circumstances, and under those circumstances it seems to me that there is some advantage to moving ahead and locking in the Russians and the Ukrainians and Kazakhs and Byelarussians to these provisions and getting them started as a framework for how these strategic forces are to be dealt with.

I think also, leaving aside the situation inside each of the successor states, there is the uncertain future of the CIS itself, and under these circumstances, and with that degree of potential, my own view would be that there is some advantage to moving forward.

But let me invite General Clapper and others to comment.

General CLAPPER. Sir, I would simply endorse again, speaking from strictly an intelligence perspective, that this question involves what is largely a policy determination. As to the timing or sequence of entering into the agreements from the standpoint of starting the clock as soon as possible with START I as a foundation, I personally think it would be in our best interest to do so.

The other advantage I think has to do with the additional information to be gleaned by our entering into an agreement on START I, in that doing so further locks in both the processes and structure connected with monitoring the treaty plus the follow-on START II. Does anyone else want to comment?

Mr. MACEACHIN. Sir, I was just going to make the point that General Clapper did. In addition to all of the reasons that the DCI described, there is a very tumultuous, volatile situation in the CIS. To be on the scene with the verification measures that have been negotiated in this treaty, to gain more openness by instituting all the information exchanges, by instituting all of the inspections, this

will give us an access to information which I think would be extremely valuable for everything with respect to that.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. I will have other questions in due course, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to confine my remarks to Director Gates to the budgetary realities of the intelligence community relative to the obligation to monitor under the complex provisions of the treaty.

Specifically, Director Gates, with the House discussion on cuts—I might also add, Mr. Chairman, that I serve on the Intelligence Committee as well as this committee. As one of two Senators here, Senator Cranston and myself, we have the responsibility for interchange in that regard. The ability of you to function under some of the extreme cuts proposed would do what to your monitoring capability? Extreme cuts will do what? Will they hinder or curtail your ability, or basically dictate an inadequacy in function? I am interested in your general comments in that regard.

Mr. GATES. I can be much more specific in the closed session, Senator Murkowski, but first I would note that we already have programmed cuts, as a result of budget action already taken, that will eliminate some of the important capabilities that we have had in the past to assess some of the provisions of this treaty. However, we think there are some offsetting capabilities in the provisions of the treaty that allow us to give the kind of testimony that we have this morning. We have made reductions already in the overhead constellation of national technical means. A more dramatic cut in the near term, particularly in these overhead systems, I think would have severe consequences for our ability to monitor this treaty adequately. As I have indicated in the testimony, we would have to assess them on a case-by-case basis, and I think also, be given time to orchestrate a strategy on how we were going to deal with cuts in these systems. We might be able to find compensating sources of information, but a dramatic deep cut in a very short period of time would have a potentially severe impact. Is there anything anyone wants to add?

Mr. MACEACHIN. No.

Mr. GERSHWIN. No.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I might add, Mr. Chairman, that this kind of dilemma, the question of what congressional intent of adequate coverage is, may be in contrast with these proposed deep cuts. Obviously, we cannot go into those here in open session, but I appreciate your answer.

Mr. GATES. There is one addition that I might make, Senator Murkowski. We find an interest, as I indicated in the testimony, in reducing those systems that have been dedicated to monitoring Soviet military forces over the past decades now that the cold war is over and the Soviet Union has disappeared.

Unfortunately, while those political events have taken place and no one questions the revolutionary character of those political events, as I suggested in the testimony we are being asked no fewer questions both by the Congress and by the administration in terms of those very forces, both in connection with arms control but also in command and control, location, security, and so on. So we

are a little bit caught betwixt and between in terms of these pressures to reduce these capabilities in a post-cold war world but also the continuing expectations of us.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. The committee will now recess and move up to S-407.

[Whereupon, at 10:40 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene in closed session.]

START TREATY: INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TREATY BETWEEN THE U.S AND THE U.S.S.R. ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SIGNED IN MOSCOW ON JULY 31, 1991 (TREATY DOC. 102-20) and Protocol Thereto Dated May 23, 1992 (TREATY DOC. 102-32)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell and Cranston.

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order.

I would like very much to welcome Gen. Robert Parker, Director of the On-Site Inspection Agency. General Parker and the agency he directs will be responsible for the very important inspections called for under the START Treaty.

The general will be able to give our committee a good impression of the task facing the On-Site Inspection Agency, as well as what might be anticipated with regard to Russian inspections in the United States.

When Senator Lugar comes, I would ask you to desist for a moment, so he can make a statement. But now the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. ROBERT W. PARKER, USAF, DIRECTOR, ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY

General PARKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here today and I thank you for the opportunity to tell you about activities the On-Site Inspection Agency has been involved with as we plan and prepare for the implementation of the strategic arms talks.

Senator, with your concurrence, I would like to submit for the record my formal statement and by using the charts we have here and the papers and slides you have in front of you, I would like to discuss in more detail exactly what we have done in the On-Site Inspection Agency.

The CHAIRMAN. Your full text of your statement will be inserted in the record as if read.

General PARKER. As you know, the On-Site Inspection Agency was formed as a result of the INF Treaty, which was signed in 1987. From that small group of 40 people, we have grown to about 650 people now and we cover 19 time zones.

And the map you see here would cover from San Francisco on our west coast all the way around to Yokota, Japan. We have locations for points of entry in the United States, both in Washington,